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THE WHY OF CONSTITUTIONAL ESSENTIALS
Lawrence G. Sager*
In this Essay, I want to take up questions that emerge when we set
Rawls's account of the constitutional essentials of political liberalism
alongside what I regard as the best account of American
constitutional practice-an account that I have elsewhere called
"justice-seeking constitutionalism." This is not because I imagine that
Rawls has this or any other account of American practice directly in
mind, or that our practice should be strictly measured against Rawls's
theory. Rather, my hope is that we can understand Rawls in Political
Liberalism1 more clearly if we set his ideas against questions raised by
our practice, and, in turn, that we can better understand questions
raised by our practice in light of Rawls.
The questions have a singular focus: Why the idea of constitutional
essentials at all? Assume that we have a conceptual grip on the
boundaries of political justice. And assume further that if we have
judicial review at all, it will fall short of enforcing all of the
constitutional essentials. Under these conditions, why should the
constitutional essentials truncate political justice? Why not treat
political justice as what is required? And how does the case on behalf
of the constitutional essentials connect with our understanding of our
own constitutional practice?
So that is the heart of my agenda: the question of the need for
constitutional essentials in a conceptual environment created by the
interaction between Rawls and the best account of American
constitutional practice,2 with the reciprocal ambition of better
understanding our constitutional practice as it actually is.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ESSENTIALS

The most arresting general feature of Rawls's constitutional
essentials is their compactness or their thinness. Their reach is
significantly shorter than the full domain of justice, and, for that
matter, significantly shorter than the domain of political justice. This
* Professor Sager is the Alice Jane Drysdale Sheffield Regents Chair in Law at the
University of Texas, School of Law.
1. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (2d ed. 1996).
2. My efforts to render such an account are best represented in Lawrence G.
Sager, Justice in Plainclothes: A Theory of American Constitutional Practice
(forthcoming, Yale University Press).
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is well illustrated with regard to rights of material well-being. The
difference principle is an important premise of political justice,
perhaps the precept for which Rawls is best known, but it does not, in
Rawls's view, fall within the constitutional essentials.
There are rights of material well-being within the constitutional
essentials, but they are considerably less sweeping in their scope than
would be the difference principle in operation. Here, material wellbeing is focused on a set of constitutional minima-the minimum
necessities of a decent life, or, alternatively, of a life that enables
individuals to participate as members of their society or polity. This
move from the comparatively robust difference principle to what
Rawls at least intends to be the considerably narrower and more
commonplace notions of minimal necessities is illustrative of the
constricted reach of the constitutional essentials.
So the question is: Why this truncation? Rawls, of course, while
possibly influenced by the American constitutional tradition, is talking
about constitutional practice at large, and so neither a particular
constitutional text nor a given body of precedent can offer any
support for the thinness of the constitutional essentials. Nor can the
limits of judicial competence or propriety be the basis of this
foreshortening, for the simple reason that Rawls treats neither a
written constitution nor judicial review as institutional prerequisites of
the just political community; for Rawls, both of these fall into the
category of contingent constitutional strategy.
We have, therefore, the making of a puzzle: Why, given the
contingency of a written constitution and of judicial review, and in the
midst of a political theory that takes the full domain of justice very
seriously, does Rawls's set of constitutional essentials fall considerably
short of the requirements of justice? What can be said on behalf of
the narrowed set of constitutional essentials in the Rawlsian scheme?
Three things come to mind, each of which is either more or less
explicitly invoked by Rawls or fairly attributable to the spirit of his
case for the constitutional essentials construct.
First, the
constitutional essentials need to be able to command the allegiance of
all persons who hold reasonable, comprehensive views. Rawls's
hypothesized political audience is confined to the reasonable in
Political Liberalism, but all those within the circle of the reasonable
should, in principle, be able to embrace the constitutional essentials.
We can think of this serving the demands of constitutional legitimacy.
Second, there are practical concerns about the shape of the precepts
that make up the constitutional essentials.
In the real world,
compliance or non-compliance with these essentials needs to be
readily observable, and entwined with this need for transparency is
the requirement that the essentials consist of precepts that are
categorical and non-negotiable, as opposed to values that necessarily
are to be traded against or compromised in the name of other good

2004]

THE WHY OF CONSTITUTIONAL ESSENTIALS

1423

things.
We can think of this as serving the requirements of
constitutional efficacy. Third, as a consequence of these first two
concerns in combination, there is a requirement of severability or
isolation.
Consider, for example, the difference principle, formulated in
Political Liberalism as the requirement that "organizational and
economic inequalities" be justified by their capacity to "improve
everyone's situation, including [that] of the least advantaged."3 That
principle in operation is inextricably woven into complex, ongoing
choices of a political community. Except at a level of abstraction that
is so remote from choices on the ground as to be almost irrelevant in
this context, the principle cannot be made the object of real-world
political consensus or anything approaching such consensus. And
even more clearly, the difference principle flunks the tests of practical
application-the tests, that is, of transparency, categoricality and nonnegotiability. Perhaps it would do just to stop there, but it seems
helpful to observe that both of these indictments of the difference
principle as a candidate for inclusion within the constitutional
essentials seem to combine in-or perhaps derive from-our inability
to sever or extract the difference principle from the dense factual
environments in which it is meant to operate.

II. OUR OWN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE
The foreshortening of justice is echoed in our own constitutional
tradition. There are conspicuous absences of appealing principles of
political justice in our constitutional tradition.
There is no
acknowledged right of material well-being in the form of a narrow
right to minimum welfare. Nor does our constitutional tradition
recognize anything like a governmental duty to repair the structural,
entrenched residue of historic injustices like slavery and the legal
disablement of women.
In our own tradition, there may appear to be simple explanations
for this. We, after all, are working at base with an eighteenth century
constitution and many decades of accumulated precedent, which
together may seem to debar both a constitutional entitlement to
material well-being and a governmental duty of repair. But the
Constitution typically speaks in broad, moral generalities, and judicial
precedent is relatively fluid over time. And the failure of the Supreme
Court to move forthrightly in these areas is durable (spanning, for
example, the Warren, Burger and Rehnquist Courts), and seems to
reflect widely-shared contemporary judgment, rather than the tethers
of text or history. If one believes that contemporary constitutional
adjudication is and should be justice-seeking rather than originalist-

3. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 282.
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as I emphatically do-some other explanation is required for this
moral shortfall.
There is such an explanation readily at hand, of course: Rawls is
not wed to judicial review, but we are. Common both to a right of
material well-being and a duty of repair is their poor fit with judicial
enforcement.
While constitutional obligations of this sort have
comparatively crisp precepts at their core, they require elaborate
programs of implementation, and these implementing programs
depend on complex choices of strategy and responsibility. Courts
seem poor venues for the shaping of these choices. So it might be
simply the demands of justiciability that constrain the reach of
American constitutional practice.
This assumes, however, that our constitutional practice is best
understood as making questions of constitutional adjudication and
constitutional meaning more or less congruent. And that assumption
seems flatly wrong. Our constitutional tradition is best understood as
one in which the constitutional judiciary, even in its most robust and
plausible form, falls considerably short of exhausting constitutional
meaning. On this account, it would be precisely areas like the right to
minimum welfare and the duty to repair the entrenched consequences
of historical injustice that would be underenforced by the judiciary.
This is not the place to rehearse at length the case for the
underenforcement view of our constitutional practice. 4 But there are
both normative and descriptive claims on its behalf that we can
observe in passing. On the normative front, there are these two things
to say. First, the reasons for limiting the reach of constitutional
adjudication are exquisitely institutional; that is to say, they are good
reasons for courts to stop short of enforcing a right to minimum
welfare or a duty to repair, and not reasons at all for us to regard the
Constitution itself as turning away from otherwise deeply appealing
claims of political justice. Second, the precepts so conspicuously
omitted from our adjudicated constitutional tradition are deeply
appealing claims of political justice. The notion that we as a people
are obliged to undo the bitter and pervasive consequences of entire
regimes of unconstitutional behavior like slavery and its Jim Crow
aftermath, or the systematic legal disablement of women, is surely
compelling. So too is the proposition that we as a people are obliged
to arrange our affairs so that, say, a person who is willing to work hard
on behalf of herself and her family should be able, in turn, to provide
for herself and her family minimally adequate nutrition, housing,
medical services, and education. To the independent normative force
of these claims there must be added the observation that without
4. I have tried to make that case in Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The
Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212 (1978),
and Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of
ConstitutionalLaw, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 410 (1993).
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serious commitment to freeing the historically disadvantaged from the
lingering consequences of their disablement and serious commitment
to some form of minimum welfare, our more familiar constitutional
commitments have a distinctly hollow ring. The point of this last
observation is not that the persons should be fed and relieved of the
burdens of historic discrimination so that they can exercise their more
commonly recognized constitutional entitlements. The point is rather
that robust constitutional entitlements that exclude some form of a
right to minimum welfare and some form of a duty to repair are for
that reason incoherently incomplete. All this being so, in a justiceseeking account of our constitutional practice, it is far better to
include these precepts within the bounds of constitutional justice.
The descriptive claim on behalf of underenforcement centers on the
durable presence within our constitutional jurisprudence of a number
of cases that make much more sense when they are understood as
reflecting what we might think of as the secondary, judicially
recognized, consequences of the duty to repair and the right to
minimum welfare. These consequences are secondary in the sense
that the primary constitutional obligations are in each instance beyond
the scope of judicial enforcement, but the existence of those primary
obligations nevertheless inspires or demands judicial responses at one
remove. Once again, this is not the place to make this argument at
length, but perhaps a list of the salient cases would be useful. One
such case is Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,5 where the Court held: (1)
that as a matter of spontaneous judicial interpretation and application,
the Thirteenth Amendment bars actual slavery or indentured
servitude, not mere private racial discrimination;6 but nevertheless, (2)
that Congress, in the name of enforcing the substantive provisions of
the Amendment, can broadly prohibit private racial discrimination.7
Jones, on this account is an instance of remedial underenforcement of
the Constitution by the courts: The broad structural harm of slavery
calls for equally wide-ranging remedial actions, but remedies of this
sort depend on legislative rather than judicial action. Hence, Jones
suggests the idea of a judicially unenforced duty to repair. More
recent cases have implicated this reading of Jones, at least potentially.8
Another set of cases points in the direction of an unenforced right
to minimum welfare. These divide into procedural cases, where a
distinct tradition of civil due process seems to attach uniquely to
5. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
6. Id. at 413.
7. Id.
8. A prominent missed opportunity to apply the lesson of Jones was United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), or so I have argued in Lawrence G. Sager, A Letter
to the Supreme Court Regarding the Missing Argument in Brzonkala v. Morrison, 75
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 150 (2000). On the other hand, this lesson, I believe, best explains the
Court's decision in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721
(2003), but that is a longer story than can be told in these pages.
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minimum welfare cases,9 and substance cases, where in a number of
cases the Court has policed the distribution of elements of minimum
welfare against the possibility of unjust categorical exclusions. These
last cases are striking in a number of ways, not the least of which is
that they reach as far forward as the contemporary Rehnquist Court.10
Each of the cases referenced in this paragraph is perfectly consistent
with the tacit existence of a right to minimum welfare; each is
anomalous as a matter of contemporary constitutional jurisprudence
without the inclusion of a right to minimum welfare; and each is much
more
easily
reconciled
with
contemporary
constitutional
jurisprudence when a right to minimum welfare is posited.
Thus goes the descriptive claim on behalf of the underenforcement
thesis. Together, the normative and descriptive claims lend strong
support to the idea that we should see the limits of adjudication as
distinct from the limits of constitutional meaning.
When we decouple the adjudicated Constitution from the
Constitution as a whole, however, the question of whether-and, if so,
why-we should understand our actual constitutional practice to
embody an analog of Rawls's constitutional essentials becomes
considerably more complex. As the following diagrams indicate, we
can pose the question schematically. For Rawls, even in the absence
of judicial review, there exists a subset of the requirements of political
justice, the constitutional essentials:

9. The most important case here is Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
10. These closet minimum welfare cases were astutely invoked early on by Frank
I. Michelman in Welfare Rights in a ConstitutionalDemocracy, 1979 Wash. U. L.Q.
659 (1979). The most recent and one of the most striking of these cases is Saenz v.
Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
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And, if our account of American constitutional practice embraces
the idea that the constitutional judiciary systematically underenforces
the Constitution as a whole, then the adjudicated Constitution is in
effect a subset of the whole of the Constitution:

But these two divisions of justice are not conceptually congruent or
even roughly analogous. Rawls, remember, is not committed to
judicial review, which he regards as only one possible institutional
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strategy for securing the constitutional essentials.11 So issues of
judicial capacity or propriety are not the explanation for the
narrowing of political justice into the constitutional essentials, and,
perforce, they do not determine the content of the constitutional
essentials. In contrast, it is precisely questions of judicial capacity and
propriety that determine the boundaries of the adjudicated
Constitution in the justice-seeking account of our constitutional
practice. And it is easy to identify specific elements of political justice
that are good candidates for inclusion in the constitutional essentials,
but are almost certainly destined to be excluded from the adjudicated
Constitution. The right to minimum welfare and the governmental
duty to repair are very good examples, as a matter of fact.
Our concern here, however, is different from this failed comparison.
Our concern is with the possibility that there is a second division or
gap to be observed as part of the best account of our constitutional
practice. We have already argued for the existence of a gap between
the adjudicated Constitution and the whole of constitutional justice.
Is there also a gap between constitutional justice and political justice
in its entirety? I think that there is such a second gap and, moreover,
that we can better understand the reasons for and scope of that gap by
thinking of it as at least roughly analogous to the gap between Rawls's
constitutional essentials and political justice as a whole.

11. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 233.
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ESSENTIALS AND THE DOMAIN OF
CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE

Rawls's justifications for the thinness of the constitutional
essentials, remember, are offered in a conceptual environment that is
not committed to judicial review or, for that matter, even to a written
constitution. In our own constitutional system, judicial review is a
settled and important feature of the landscape; but it does not exhaust
the whole of the Constitution. It follows that justiciability concerns
cannot justify a limited domain of constitutional justice in our practice
any more than such concerns can account for the limited contents of
the constitutional essentials in Rawls's general prescription in Political
Liberalism. In both cases, constitutional content can exist outside
judicial enforcement; and in both, accordingly, the institutional
limitations that attend to judicial enforcement should not foreshorten
constitutional content.
When we considered the gap between Rawls's constitutional
essentials and political justice as a whole, we saw three conjunctive
justifications for the foreshortening of political justice. We can restate
them as follows: first, as a matter of principle, the constitutional
essentials should enjoy the broad support of all members of the
political community who hold reasonable comprehensive views;
second, as a matter of practical efficacy, the constitutional essentials in
application should be transparent, categorical, and non-negotiable
against competing social goods; and third, the constitutional essentials
should be susceptible to isolation from the complex web of social
circumstances characteristic of a modern society, in order to make
them eligible for satisfaction of the first two stipulations.
My suggestion is simply this: Much the same reasons should
encourage us to regard the domain of constitutional justice as falling
significantly short of the whole of political justice as those reasons
which led Rawls to truncate the constitutional essentials. The same
ultimate concerns of legitimacy and efficacy that led Rawls to shrink
his broad-reaching principles of political justice to the size of his
constitutional essentials encourage a comparable narrowing in our
own constitutional practice of what I have called the domain of
constitutional justice.
Beyond this normative impetus to narrow the domain of
constitutional justice, there is a descriptive claim on behalf of the gap
between constitutional justice and the whole of political justice, just as
there was on behalf of the gap between the adjudicated Constitution
and the whole of the Constitution-or in the vocabulary that we have
adopted in passing, the domain of constitutional justice. Indeed, much
the same resources inform both claims. When we discussed this first
gap, we gestured toward a variety of cases, spanning the Warren,
Burger, and Rehnquist Courts, which seem best understood as
reflective of a secondary judicial response to a right to minimum
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welfare or a governmental duty to repair that are judicially
unenforceable as primary rights. Those same cases indirectly intimate
the existence of a domain or sphere of constitutional justice that falls
far short of embracing all of political justice. They perform this role
by virtue of their singularity: There are few if any other claims
sounding in political justice that have, in effect, left secondary traces
of their presence in our constitutional practice. (If there are such
others, I predict, they will assume the form of core-well, essentialprecepts of the sort represented by the right to minimum welfare and
the duty to repair.) On at least one occasion, in fact, the Court by its
secondary responses has drawn a sharp line at what might well be a
boundary point marking the reach of constitutional justice: The Court
has held that the recipients of basic welfare grants have a due process
right to an evidentiary hearing before their benefits can be
terminated;" 2 but the recipients of other public benefits that do not
implicate "the very margin of subsistence"' 3 do not enjoy such a right.
If we accept the picture of our constitutional practice that I have
argued for here, in which the adjudicated Constitution is reduced from
the whole, and the whole of constitutional substance is reduced from
all of political justice, we have gone a long way toward seeing a fertile
parallel between Rawlsian theory and American constitutional
practice. But many questions remain, and perhaps we can gesture
towards one or two of those before bringing this discussion to a close.
One question is intimated by the vocabulary I have offered here. We
surely could call the middle circle in our schematic "the Constitution
as a whole," or possibly "the constitutional essentials." But I offered
"the domain of constitutional justice." My thought is this: On this
account, many of the matters that fall within the domain of
constitutional justice are subject to primary judicial enforcement and
can be stated as more or less full-blown matters of principle and made
the object of implementing doctrine. But some precepts, like the right
to minimum welfare and the duty to repair, are not judicially
enforceable. Of these latter precepts we can observe the following:
they involve precepts that are comparatively transparent, categorical
and non-negotiable, but they cannot be dispatched with anything
resembling a doctrinal sweep. They are ongoing projects open for
long intervals to adjustment, critique and refocusing. And even in the
wonderful event that we should reach something like a stable and
satisfactory equilibrium in one of these projects, a new wave of
immigration, changes in medical technology, or other such events
could easily unseat that state of affairs. In the face of this, it seems
natural to speak in the spatial terms of a restricted domain in which

12. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264.
13. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 340 (1976).
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extra-judicial actors have the primary duty and authority to act, rather
than in terms that sound in static or final dispositions.
The scope of the judicially unenforced portion of the domain of
constitutional justice has consequences for at least two sets of
institutional actors. For the constitutional judiciary there are-as we
have .already observed in passing-secondary consequences that
explain and should guide specific outcomes. For popular political
actors-importantly including, but by no means limited to,
legislators-there are heightened responsibilities and potentially
heightened political impact associated with actions proposed or taken
in the name of the Constitution. For both sets of actors, it is
important that the outer reach of constitutional justice be constricted.
For the constitutional judiciary, it will generally be the case that public
programs or provisions that fall within constitutional justice will be
privileged in some significant way: Congress will have authority it
would not otherwise enjoy, special procedural rights will attach, or the
victims of categorical exclusions will be entitled to significantly
enhanced judicial scrutiny of the decision to exclude them. Each of
these forms of privilege carries significant costs. The expansion of
national authority comes at the expense of the values of federalism;
special hearings in the name of due process are costly in various ways;
and increased judicial scrutiny commits the judiciary to increased
interventions in the decisions of other governmental actors. All this
places a premium on a bounded constitutional domain.
For popular political actors, some of the distinct features of projects
undertaken in the name of the Constitution are merely reciprocals of
the constitutional judiciary's secondary responses to such projects:
Congress's authority to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity
of the states-and in some cases, authority to act at all-may turn on
the question of whether it is understood to be acting within the
bounds of constitutional justice; and legislation that is understood to
be within those bounds may be subject to substantially increased
judicial demands of substantive or procedural fairness. But other
features that may distinguish constitutional politics will be wholly
independent of the judiciary. Legislators ought to feel distinct
responsibilities to act or withhold action because of the demands of
constitutional justice, and discourse among legislators or between
legislators and their constituents should offer these demands as
reasons to act or withhold action. For popular political actors, too, on
all these counts, there is a large premium to be placed on a bounded
and at least roughly identifiable domain of constitutional justice.
CONCLUSION

In the world of Rawlsian justice, injustices that lie outside the
constitutional essentials are not meant to be forgotten or forgiven;
nor, to be sure, should we forgive or forget injustices outside the reach
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of our Constitution. But both for Rawls and for us there are powerful
reasons for understanding a constitution and the legal acts
appropriately taken in the name of its concerns with justice to occupy
a more limited and more focused domain than that occupied by
political justice as a whole. For neither Rawls nor for us do the
boundaries of constitutional justice depend on the appropriately
limited reach of constitutional adjudication.
And for us,
notwithstanding our commitment to robust judicial oversight in the
name of the Constitution, the boundaries of constitutional justice are
measurably broader than the reach of the adjudicated Constitution.

Notes & Observations

